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We regress leverage on an index of corporate exposure to expropriation by the controlling
shareholder — the ratio of his ownership rights O to his control rights C — and on an index of
creditor rights. Amongst corporations that can access related party loans, a lower O/C ratio
increases leverage when creditor protection is weak; but reduces leverage where creditor
protection is strong. In the first case, higher leverage gives the controlling shareholder control of
more resources to expropriate. In the second case, minority shareholders and external lenders
constrain the leverage of group affiliates that seemed more vulnerable to expropriation.
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DEBT AND EXPROPRIATION

We regress leverage on an index of corporate exposure to expropriation by the controlling
shareholder — the ratio of his ownership rights O to his control rights C — and on an index of
creditor rights. Amongst corporations that can access related party loans, a lower O/C ratio
increases leverage when creditor protection is weak; but reduces leverage where creditor
protection is strong. In the first case, higher leverage gives the controlling shareholder control of
more resources to expropriate. In the second case, minority shareholders and external lenders
constrains the leverage of group affiliates that seemed more vulnerable to expropriation.
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I. Introduction
The role of debt in corporate governance depends on how governance is exercised, i.e., on
the structure of corporate ownership and control. Default on corporate debt might not affect the
professional manager’s net worth, but would certainly devastate his reputation and career. This
would not be a concern for the controlling shareholder of a corporate group, who employs
himself as top manager and can borrow through a group affiliate from a group bank. By
pyramiding, he can control corporations and banks at the base with a low ownership stake, then
use bank loans to transfer resources up to the top of the pyramid, expropriating shareholders and
bank depositors at the bottom. Thus, debt could constrain the expropriation of dispersed
shareholders by professional managers, as in the U.S.; yet it could facilitate the expropriation of
minority shareholders and bank depositors by the controlling shareholders of the corporate
groups that dominate the business scene in Europe and Asia.1 This paper seeks to distinguish
between these two roles of debt by considering the ownership, control and leverage of all listed
corporations with credible accounting data in the five largest European economies and nine East
Asian economies.
In their pioneering analysis of the agency problems between professional managers and
dispersed corporate shareholders, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that debt constrains
managerial expropriation by imposing fixed obligations on corporate cash flow. This argument
was further developed by Jensen (1986, 1989) in the context of leveraged buyouts, which forced

1

La Porta, LopezdeSilanes and Zamarripa (2002) show that related party lending represents in Mexico a
substantial fraction of funds borrowed by firms. Extensive evidence of looting is also found in Russia and Chile,
particularly within business groups that include banks (Akerlof and Romer, 1993, Laeven, 2001). On the other
hand, Krozner and Strahan (2001) argue that board linkages between banks and nonfinancial firms did not
systematically lead to conflicts of interests, or a misuse of funds in the US.
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managers to disgorge their corporations’ free cash flow, replacing equity with debt.2 Underlying
the constraint that debt imposes on managerial expropriation in the U.S. is the role of reputation
in the manager market (Fama and Jensen (1983a,b)). Although the manager is not personally
liable for his corporation’s debts, default would trigger windingup proceedings that would force
him to search for reemployment, just when his reputation had been crippled. However, debt
could play a different role in corporate governance if the key decisions were made by a manager
whose reputation and career are not tied specifically to the corporation liable for the debt and/or
the debt is provided, not at arms length, but by a bank that shared a controlling shareholder with
the corporation.
In contrast to the US, many corporations in Europe and Asia have a controlling block of
shares held by one shareholder, who also appoints the top managers, so that the key agency
problem is between the controlling and the minority shareholders. The controlling shareholder
often exerts control through a pyramid structure, controlling corporations lower down the
pyramid through corporations higher up the pyramid.3 If the controlling shareholder owns 100%
of corporation X, that owns 60% of corporation Y, that owns 25% of corporation Z, then its
ownership rights in Z are O = 100%x60%x25% =15%, yet, via its majority control of X and Y,
its control rights in Z are C = 25% — usually enough for effective control. By directing Z to buy
goods or assets from X at a premium, the controlling shareholder expropriates 100% 15% of the

2

Easterbrook (1984) argues that debt forces managers to be accountable to the external capital market. Lang et
al. (1996) document that debt curtails investment by firms with poor prospects, and that leverage increases
when growth opportunities are less (see also Kim and Sorensen (1986), Titman and Wessels (1988)). Maloney
et al. (1993) document that leverage improves managerial decisionmaking on key issues like acquisitions.
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See, e.g., La Porta et al. (1999).
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premium from Z’s other shareholders. 4
Within a corporate pyramid, increased indebtedness by an affiliate need not constrain
expropriation by the controlling shareholder because the debt can be rolled over by group banks,
recycled into external loans guaranteed by other affiliates, or reshuffled ahead of auditors to
other affiliates by intragroup loans or transfer pricing. Even a default by the affiliate need not
damage the reputation of the manager/controlling shareholder if the affiliation is through obscure
control webs passing through several layers of the pyramid. In any case, reputational damage can
be shrugged off by a manager/controlling shareholder who employs himself within the pyramid,
in contrast to the severe problems that default would cause a professional manager thrown onto
the external manager market tainted by clear responsibility for the defaulting firm. Thus, the
higher fixed obligations implied by the affiliate’s higher debt need not constrain the controlling
shareholder more tightly. On the contrary, it could facilitate expropriation of the affiliate by
allowing the controlling shareholder to control more resources without diluting his control stake
or assuming more liabilities directly. 5 Those expropriated can include not only minority
shareholders, but also creditors left with uncollectible debt and taxpayers forced to bail out the
financial system endangered thereby.
How to determine whether debt constrains expropriation, as argued by Jensen et al., or
facilitates expropriation, as argued above? Our approach is to regress corporate leverage on an

4

Backman (1999) provides many examples of such relatedparty transactions in Asian corporate groups, which
were a major cause of the Asian Financial Crisis.
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In a U.S. context, Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) argue that controlling shareholders may use
leverage to inflate the voting power of their shares, and reduce the discipline of the market for corporate control.
Stulz (1988) shows that managers who value control very highly rely primarily on debt financing in order to
minimize dilution of their equity stakes in the firm, thus making the firm less vulnerable to hostile takeover.
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index of the corporation’s exposure to expropriation by the controlling shareholder — the ratio
of his ownership rights O to his control rights C — and on an index of creditor rights in the
corporation’s jurisdiction. Amongst companies with no access to related party loans, the O/C
ratio and the quality of creditor protection have insignificant impacts on leverage. Amongst
companies that can access related party loans, the O/C ratio has a significantly negative impact
on leverage in economies where creditor protection is weak; but a significantly positive impact in
economies where creditor protection is strong. In the first case, it appears that higher leverage
gives the controlling shareholder control of more resources to expropriate. In the second case, it
appears that minority shareholders and external lenders constrain the leverage of group affiliates
that seem more vulnerable to expropriation.
Section II describes our data and Section III the regression variables. Our regression results
are reported in Section IV and interpreted in Section V. Section V concludes.
II. Data
We consider the 5 largest West European economies (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
U.K.) and 9 East Asian economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand). The 1996 accounting data of all corporations listed
in these countries is taken from the Worldscope database. We eliminate corporations reporting
data that are not credible (i.e., negative debt or negative sales), and corporations with missing
data on shortterm debt, longterm debt, book or market value of equity, total assets, sales,
earnings, or income taxes. We also exclude corporations whose main or secondary twodigit SIC
is in the financial industry (SIC: 6069), because their leverage ratios do not bear on agency
issues. The 199697 ownership and group affiliation data on these corporations are taken from
Worldscope, national stock exchanges, national company handbooks and the other sources listed
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in Appendices A and B. The network of indirect ownership via other corporations is traced back
in order to identify all the ultimate owners of each corporation that own at least 5% of its shares.
For these corporations, we also compute the control stake of any ultimate owner that maintains a
chain of control over that corporation that includes at least 5% of the control rights at each link.6
This ownership and control data is taken from Claessens et al. (2000) for East Asia and from
Faccio and Lang (2000) for Western Europe. The screening up to this point leaves 3964 non
financial corporations. Further screening is required to ensure that our sample of corporations
account for debt on a consistent basis, in particular, in consolidating accounts with subsidiaries.
Consolidation forces the assets and liabilities of each subsidiary to be recognized in the
accounts of the parent corporation. This can significantly affect our measures of leverage in
some countries. Rajan and Zingales (1995) noted that, in the year a corporation consolidates its
accounts, its debttocapital ratio increases, on average, by 5% over the previous year. This
suggests that if our sample included a parent corporation with unconsolidated accounts, then we
would typically be underrecording its leverage compared to a similar corporation with
consolidated accounts.

7

To ensure consistency in the reporting of debt, we eliminate all 435

corporations reporting unconsolidated accounts, as well as 81 corporations that provided no
information about whether or not their accounts were consolidated. This elimination biases our
empirical results against the conclusion that debt facilitates expropriation. This is because some
eliminated corporations could have been using debt booked to subsidiaries to expropriate, while

6

The same 5% cutoff was used by La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (1999a).
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In our sample, industry and countryadjusted leverage ratios are significantly higher (at the 1% level) for
companies reporting consolidated accounts (88.8% of the total); for the first measure of leverage defined in
Section IIIA, the difference is 7.9%, for the second it is 12.3%.
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avoiding account consolidation legitimately or illegitimately. 8
We define control of a corporation as direct or indirect holdings of its voting stock that sum
to at least 20 percent.9 We define a corporation to be “groupaffiliated” if it meets one of the
following criteria: (i) it is controlled by a shareholder via pyramiding, i.e., indirectly via a chain
of other corporations in the sample; (ii) it controls another corporation in the sample; (iii) it has
the same controlling shareholder as at least one other corporation in the sample; (iv) its
controlling shareholder is a corporation or financial institution that is “widelyheld” in that no
shareholder holds 10% or more of the voting rights10. We define a corporation to have access to
related party loans if it belongs to a group that also controls a financial institution11.
The consolidated accounts of a parent corporation recognize the assets and liabilities of the
subsidiaries that they “control”, as defined in the accounting rules of their host country. This
accounting definition is typically much more restrictive than ours. For example, the European
Union Directive 7/83 requires a parent corporation to produce consolidated accounts if it holds a
majority of the subsidiary’s voting rights, or controls the majority of its board. Therefore,

8

Though by the end of our sample period, most companies had moved to consolidated accounts, this was true for
only 63.6% of companies in Korea, 78% in Germany, and 80.9% in Japan. Therefore, we have screened out a
significant number of firms from these countries, thereby understating the role of some large groups, such as the
Korean chaebols. After our screening, Hyundai and Lucky Goldstar have only 8 group affiliates each. Chaebol
became famous after the Asian financial crisis for using subsidiaries to “park” debt out of the sight of auditors
of the parent.

9

Researchers typically use either the 20 percent or the 10 percent standard; we obtain similar results with the 10
percent standard.

10

Such corporations have the same incentive and opportunity to manipulate the corporations that they control as
the controlling shareholder of a corporate pyramid. The same definition was used in Claessens et al. (1999b).
Khanna and Palepu (2000) use a different definition.

11

Financial institutions include banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, private pension funds, merchant banks
and venture capitalists. Similar results are obtained if we confine financial institutions to banks.
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corporation A might control corporation B in our sense of holding at least 20% of B’s voting
rights, yet A would not control B in the accounting sense, so A and B would not consolidate their
accounts. Conversely, corporation A could control an unlisted corporation B in the accounting
sense — and therefore consolidate their accounts — yet A and B would not, on that basis, be
affiliated to a group according to our definition, which requires that a group include at least two
listed firms. Thus, affiliation to the same group in our sense is neither necessary nor sufficient for
two firms to consolidate their accounts.
Our definition of a “group” brings our empirical analysis to bear on listed corporations that
typically have many outside shareholders, who might be expropriated by the controlling
shareholder. Therefore, our analysis incorporates debt between two listed corporations affiliated
to the same group, provided that neither is controlled by the other in the accounting sense; such
debt is relevant to the agency issues addressed in this paper. Our analysis ignores debt between a
listed corporation and the unlisted subsidiaries that it controls in the accounting sense, which is
eliminated by consolidation; such debt is not relevant to agency issues since it is hardly likely to
constrain the management of the parent corporation, nor to facilitate expropriation in view of its
transparency in the consolidated accounts. Our analysis excludes the unlisted subsidiaries of
corporations reporting consolidated accounts; these subsidiaries usually have a few block
shareholders and thus are not exposed to the agency problems which are our focus. Nonfinancial
companies do not consolidate account with financial firms, so our leverage measures include
loans from group banks and financial companies.
Our analysis will be based on the 3448 nonfinancial corporations known to have
consolidated accounts. A significant policy implication of our research is that it would be
desirable to require account consolidation at the much lower levels of control where we find
evidence of expropriation.

10

III. Regression Variables
We regress corporate leverage on two variables associated with agency problems: the O/C
ratio, and creditor rights as a proxy for institutional quality, plus variables to control for other
factors which might have a systematic impact on leverage, and therefore might induce spurious
correlations. The regression variables are now described.
A. Leverage
We define debt as the sum of longterm and shortterm financial debt. This excludes non
financial liabilities, such as accounts payable, provisions for pensions, deferred taxes, and other
provisions for future liabilities. Two alternative measures of leverage are used:


The debt/total asset ratio (D/TA), where total assets includes debt, nonfinancial liabilities,
and shareholder equity.



The debt/(debt+equity) ratio (D/(D+E)), where the denominator includes debt and
shareholder equity, but excludes all nonfinancial liabilities.

Book values are used rather than market values, which already reflect market expectations of
expropriation.
B. Ownership and Control of Corporations
Dispersed shareholders have difficulty concerting their actions, so the largest shareholder can
control a corporation if it holds enough voting shares. For each corporation in our sample, we
identify the “controlling shareholder”, if any, i.e., the largest shareholder holding at least a 20
percent of control rights, a standard of control used in earlier studies such as La Porta et al.
(1999) and Claessens et al. (2000). If the controlling shareholder is a corporation or financial
institution, then we identify its owners, its owners' owners, etc. If the controlling shareholder is
an unlisted company, then we consider the corporation to be family controlled (with the

11

exception of corporations controlled by unlisted financial institutions). We do not distinguish
amongst family members as shareholders, but use the family as the unit of analysis.
The controlling shareholder of a corporate group can gain control rights in a corporation Z in
excess of its ownership rights by pyramiding, i.e., owning Z indirectly through other
corporations. If it owns a fraction x of the shares of corporation X, which owns a fraction y of
the shares in corporation Y, which owns a fraction z of the shares in Z, then via this ownership
chain, it owns a fraction xyz of the shares of Z. However, its share of the control rights of Z via
this control chain can be measured by its weakest link, i.e., the minimum of x, y and z. Let O be
the controlling shareholder’s share of the ownership rights in a corporation and let C be its share
of the control rights, aggregated over all control chains. The O/C ratio will be low if it controls
the corporation via long chains of intermediate corporations, so that it has the ability and
incentive to expropriate minority shareholders via unfairlypriced intragroup transactions. Like
Bebchuk et al. (1998), Claessens et al. (1999a), La Porta et al. (2000), and Faccio et al. (2001),
we use O/C to quantify a corporation’s vulnerability to expropriation because its conceptual
simplicity facilitates exposition and empirical analysis. Since O/C might fail to reflect this
vulnerability fully, our regressions are biased toward finding insignificant results.
C. Creditor Rights
We use the index of creditor protection developed in LaPorta, LopezdeSilanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998), which aggregates 4 categories of creditor rights. To test for the impact of creditor
protection on the relationship between leverage and vulnerability to expropriation, we also
include the product of the Creditor Rights index with O/C as an independent variable in the
regression.

12

D. Tobin’s Q
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of debt to the sum of book
value of equity plus book value of debt. The empirical evidence in the U.S. is that corporations
with a high Q tend to have low leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995) report a negative
relationship between leverage and the markettobook ratio for a sample of large corporations in
the U.S., Germany, France, United Kingdom and Canada. 12 Tobin’s Q is often interpreted as a
proxy for a corporation’s growth opportunities. 13 Titman (1984), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim
(1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), and Maksimovic and Titman (1991), amongst others, find a
negative relationship between leverage and other proxies for growth opportunities, such as the
human capital of its employees, the brand image of its products, or other intangible assets that
cannot be accepted as collateral by prudent lenders.14 This negative relationship is also consistent
with Myers’ (1977) analysis of debt overhang as a constraint on a corporation’s willingness to
undertake positive NPV projects financed by stockholders because this would benefit
bondholders. Highergrowth corporations might exhibit lower leverage because they face higher

12

However, the relationship is not significant in Italy and Japan when a book value measure of leverage is used; it
becomes significant when leverage is measured at market value. McConnell and Servaes (1995) find that for
high growth firms, Q is negatively affected by leverage; for low growth firms, they find a positive correlation
between Q and leverage. Lang et al (1996) find that higher levels of leverage have a negative impact on the
growth of the firm when Q < 1, but a positive (though insignificant) impact when Q > 1. They argue that debt
disciplines management when Q < 1, preventing them from investing in negative NPV projects. For firms with
Q > 1, (i.e., good investment opportunities) high leverage does not constrain management.
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Another widelyused proxy for growth opportunities is the historical sales growth rate, which we used as a
check, but without finding any significant difference in the results. The use the Qratio is supported by the
consideration that lenders should be more concerned about future growth (i.e., ability to pay back debt) rather
than historical growth.

14

Some studies of the U.K. (e.g., Lasfer (1995)) also find a negative relationship between leverage and growth.
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costs of financial distress (Fama and French (1992))15. We control separately for this latter risk
via the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) to interest expenses —
see the discussion of bankruptcy risk below.
E. Firm Size
This is measured by the logarithm of the corporation's total assets, Ln(TA). Rajan and
Zingales (1995) argue that size could proxy for the probability of default, which is higher for
smaller firms. On the other hand, larger, more visible firms suffer less from informational
asymmetry, have easier access to equity markets and, therefore, should be less levered. Mixed
evidence is provided by Hoshi, Scharfstein and Kashyap (1990), Kester (1986), Kim and
Sorensen (1986), and Rajan and Zingales (1995).
F. Asset Tangibility
This is measured by the ratio of fixed to total assets (Tangib). Rajan and Zingales (1995),
argue that fixed assets are easier to collateralize, and so reduce the agency costs of debt.
However, Berger and Udell (1994) argue that this relationship would be weaker in relationship
oriented economies. Myers (1977) suggests that the debt overhang problem would be less for
corporations with tangible assets, which could imply a positive association between leverage and
tangible assets. Harris and Raviv (1990) argue that corporations with more tangible assets have a
higher liquidation value, which increases the usefulness of information to stockholders; since
debt provides them information (e.g., on the corporation’s ability to service debt), they require
higher leverage in corporations with more tangible assets.

15

The preceding studies do not control for this possibility in analyzing the relationship between leverage and
growth, so it is not possible to distinguish between the two hypotheses.
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G. Volatility.
We control for volatility using asset betas; see Table 1 for computational details. In line with
Myers (1977), leverage has been found to decrease with operating risk (Kim and Sorensen
(1986)) and return volatility (Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984).
H. Bankruptcy Risk.
Harris and Raviv (1990) find that leverage is negatively correlated with the interest coverage
ratio and the probability of reorganization following default. Ross (1977) and Harris and Raviv
(1990), amongst others, find that leverage is positively related to the probability of default. To
control for bankruptcy risk, we rank corporations in ascending order of the ratio of earnings
before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) to interest expense. BankrDec assigns
corporations to their decile in this ranking. Corporations in the first decile, with the lowest ratio
of EBITDA to interest expense, face the most difficulty in meeting interest payments. This
variable indirectly accounts for profitability also, since higher values of the EBITDA/interest
expense ratio imply higher profitability. 16 Thus, we do not further control for profitability.
Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003) argue that entrepreneurs can use debt to prop up their
corporations when they get into financial distress, thereby retaining the option for future
expropriation (“tunnelling”). Our analysis shall control for financial distress in the form of
bankruptcy risk, allowing us to focus on other ways in which debt might facilitate expropriation,
which might be captured through the impact of the O/C ratio on leverage.
I. Diversification.
We measure diversification by the number of different twodigit SIC industries in which the
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firm operates (NoSic), following Lang and Stulz (1994). Diversification can affect leverage in at
least two ways. First, through diversification, a corporation can reduce its firmspecific risk,
indicating higher leverage. Second, diversified corporations might be able to access internal
capital markets, indicating lower consolidated leverage.
IV. Regressions
Table 1 summarizes the regression variables, broken down by economy of origin: the number
of corporations in our sample, creditor rights, the percentage of corporations that can access
related party loans, leverage, and Tobin’s Q. Table 1 also reports the results of tests for
differences between the mean leverage of subsets of corporations that we conjecture have
different exposures to expropriation. We find that corporations that can borrow from related
parties have significantly higher leverage than those that cannot; corporations in economies with
weak creditor rights (index < 3) have significantly higher leverage than those with strong creditor
rights (index ≥ 3); corporations where the ownership and control rights of the controlling
shareholder are identical (O/C = 1) have significantly lower leverage (as measured by the ratio of
debt to debt plus equity) than corporations where O/C < 1.
[Table 2 about here]
The significant difference between the leverage of corporations that can/cannot access related
party loans leads us to carry out separate regressions for corporations in these two categories.
The observations for a given country may be affected by factors special to that country, such as
accounting conventions, so we adjust the standard errors for clustering at the country level and
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Harris and Raviv (1990) summarize the literature on the relationship between leverage and profitability. Kester
(1986) documents that leverage is inversely related to profitability in the U.S. and Japan.
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for heteroskedasticity. Adjusted pvalues are reported in parentheses below our coefficient
estimates.
Table 2 Panel A displays our results for corporations that can access related party loans.
Leverage is significantly higher for corporations that are more vulnerable to expropriation in that
they have a lower O/C ratio, and are domiciled where creditor protection is weaker. The
significantly positive coefficient on the product of the O/C ratio and the index of creditor
protection indicates that, in economies with better creditor protection, a higher O/C ratio has a
more positive — or less negative — impact on leverage. Of the other control variables in the
regression, we find that leverage is positively related to size, and is negatively related to the
corporation’s riskiness and exposure to bankruptcy.
By contrast, Panel B shows that neither the O/C ratio nor the quality of creditor protection
has a significant impact on the leverage of companies that cannot access related party loans,
either because they do not belong to a corporate group, or because their group does not include a
financial institution.
Might the O/C ratio have been chosen by the controlling shareholder to facilitate leverage?
To cope with this possibility of an endogenous O/C ratio, we require an instrumental variable for
O/C that is correlated with the private benefits of control, but is independent of leverage. Like
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2007), we define a dummy equal to 1 if the company’s name
includes the name of any of its top officers (CEO, chairman of the board, president, a vice
president, or secretary of the board), as reported in Worldscope, and 0 otherwise. By
construction, this nonpecuniary variable cannot be influenced by the financial attributes of a
company, such as leverage. However, it reflects nonpecuniary private benefits that the
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controlling shareholder can extract from the firm, so it should be correlated with the firm’s
control structure.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and associated pvalues (in parentheses) of twostage
least squares (2SLS) regressions with this instrumental variable for the O/C ratio. The results are
similar to those in Table 2, indicating that those results were not biased by an endogenous O/C
ratio.
Tables 2 and 3 report a significantly positive interaction between the impact of the O/C ratio
and the index of creditor protection on leverage. This leads us to partition our sample of firms
that can access related party loans between those in economies with good creditor protection
(index ≥ 3) and those in economies with poor creditor protection (index < 3). Table 4 displays
the results of separate twostage least squares regressions for these two subsamples using the
same instrumental variable for the O/C ratio as before. For countries with good creditor
protection, corporations that have a lower O/C ratio have significantly lower leverage. The
reverse is true for countries with poor creditor protection.
V. Interpretation
Our regressions are inconsistent with the hypothesis that debt constrains expropriation, but
are consistent with the hypothesis that debt facilitates expropriation. In countries with good
creditor protection, firms that are more exposed to expropriation through having a lower O/C
ratio ought to have higher leverage, under the hypothesis that debt constrains expropriation. Our
finding of a positive relationship between O/C and leverage is inconsistent with this hypothesis,
but is consistent with the hypothesis that debt facilitates expropriation. Good creditor protection
prevents controlling shareholders from using related party transactions to exploit bank depositors
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and minority shareholders. Indeed, minority shareholders, as well as external lenders, would tend
to become more cautious about loans undertaken by corporations with a lower O/C ratio,
recognizing their greater exposure to expropriation by the controlling shareholder. This would
account for our finding that such corporations tend to have lower leverage.
In countries with poor creditor protection, corporate leverage is likely to be controlled by the
controlling shareholder. Therefore, under the hypothesis that debt constrains expropriation, a
corporation that is more exposed to expropriation through a lower O/C ratio should tend to have
lower leverage, as the controlling shareholder seeks to relax the constraints imposed by debt.
Hence, our finding that a lower O/C ratio is associated with higher leverage is inconsistent with
the hypothesis that debt constrains expropriation. However, our finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that debt facilitates expropriation: under this hypothesis, a corporation that is more
exposed to expropriation through a lower O/C ratio should tend to have higher leverage, as the
controlling shareholder uses debt to secure more resources that he can pass up the pyramid via
relatedparty transactions.
VI. Conclusions
Our empirical results for companies that can access related party lending are inconsistent
with Jensen’s hypothesis that debt constrains expropriation, but are consistent with the
hypothesis that debt facilitates expropriation. Jensen’s hypothesis presumed that debtholders
monitor management — implausible for corporations whose controlling shareholder also
controls the financial institution making the loan. The controlling shareholder can hardly be
using debt to monitor himself. On the contrary, a corporation that can access related party loans
can exploit the financial institution’s shareholders and depositors. Indeed, a higher level of debt
might mislead shareholders who believe that creditors are monitoring the management and are
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therefore more willing to invest in a highlylevered company.
Our analysis identifies two groups of potential victims of expropriation via debt: the banks'
shareholders and depositors, and minority shareholders of the indebted company. Thus, when
creditor protection is poor, the controlling shareholder might allocate capital where he can
expropriate a high private return, rather than where the capital earns the highest social return. In
this way, poor creditor protection can facilitate the inefficient allocation of capital. This
illustrates how poor capital market institutions can impede economic growth, a point previously
emphasized by authors such as DemirgüçKunt and Maksimovic (1998), Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990), Levine (1997), and Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES FOR EAST ASIAN CORPORATIONS (FROM CLAESSENS, DJANKOV & LANG (2000))

Country

Immediate Ownership Data

Hong Kong Worldscope (1998)
Asian Company Handbook (1998)
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (1997)

DualClass Shares
Datastream International (1998)

Business Groups: Pyramids and CrossHoldings
Chu, YinWah and Gary Hamilton, 1993, Business Networks in
Hong Kong, University of California, Davis, mimeo.
Taylor, Michael, 1998, “Have Cash, Will Travel,” Far Eastern
Economic Review, Special Section on the Li
KaShing Conglomerate, March 5.

Indonesia

Worldscope (1998)
Asian Company Handbook (1998)
Institute for Economic and Financial
Research (1996)

Datastream International (1998)
Institute for Economic and
Financial Research (1996)

Hong Kong Stock Exchange (1997).
Fisman, Ray, 1998, Announcement Effects of Suharto’s Illnesses
on Related Companies, Harvard Business School, mimeo,
September.
W.I.Carr Banque Indosuez Group, 1997, Indonesian Group
Connections, Jakarta, Indonesia
Indobusiness, 1998, 1995 Ranking of the Largest Indonesian
Conglomerates, available at
http://indobiz.com/company/warta/conglo/htm

Japan

Worldscope (1998)
Japan Company Handbook (1998)

South Korea Worldscope (1998)
Asian Company Handbook (1998)

Datastream International (1998)

Datastream International (1998)

Dodwell Marketing Consultants, 1997, Industrial Groupings in
Japan: the Anatomy of the Keiretsu,” 12th Edition, 1996/1997,
Tokyo, Japan.
Sato, Kazuo, 1984, “The Anatomy of Japanese Businesses,”
M.E.Sharpe, Chapter 4.
Korean Fair Trade Commission, 1997, 1996 List of the Largest 30
Chaebol, Seoul, Korea.
Lim, Ungki, 1998, Ownership Structure and Family Control in
Korean Conglomerates: with Cases of the 30 Largest Chaebol,
Seoul University, Korea.

27

APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)
Country
Malaysia

Philippines

Immediate Ownership Data
Worldscope (1998)

DualClass Shares
Datastream International (1998)

Asian Company Handbook (1998)

Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
(1997)

Worldscope (1998)
Asian Company Handbook (1998)
Philippine Stock Exchange (1997)

Singapore
Taiwan

Worldscope (1998)
Asian Company Handbook (1998)
Worldscope (1998)
Asian Company Handbook (1998)

Thailand

http://www.ambg.com.my for AM Banking Group
http://www.berjaya.com.my for Berjaya Group
http://ww.simenet.com for Sime Darby Group
http://www.lion.com.my for Lion Group
http://www.hongleonggroup.com.sg for Hong Leong Group
Datastream International (1998)
Philippine Stock Exchange, 1997, Investment Guide 1996,
Philippine Stock Exchange (1997) Manila.
Tan, Edita, 1993, Interlocking Directorates, Commercial Banks,
Other Financial Institutions, and NonBank Corporations,
Philippine Review of Economics and Business, 30, 150.
Datastream International (1998)
Singapore Stock Exchange, 1997, Singapore Company Handbook.
Singapore Stock Exchange (1997) Hiscock, Geoff, 1998, Asia’s Wealth Club, Nicholas Brealey.
Datastream International (1998)
China Credit Information Service, 1997, Business Groups in
Taiwan, 19961997, Taipei, Republic of China.

Worldscope (1998)

Datastream International (1998)

Asian Company Handbook (1998)

Securities Exchange of Thailand
(1997)

Securities Exchange of Thailand
(1997)

Business Groups: Pyramids and CrossHoldings
Hiscock, Geoff, 1998, Asia’s Wealth Club, Nicholas Brealey.

Baum, Julian, 1994, The Money Machine, Far Eastern Economic
Review, August 11, for the corporate holdings of the Kuomintang.
Tara Siam, 1997, Thai Business Groups 19961997: A Unique
Guide to Who Owns What, Bangkok, Thailand.
The Nation, 1998, Thai Tycoons: Winners and Losers in the
Economic Crisis, Special Issue, July.
Vatikiotis, Michael, 1997, From Chickens to Microchips: the
Story of Thai Conglomerates, Far Eastern Economic Review,
January 23.
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APPENDIX B: SOURCES OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL DATA FOR WEST EUROPEAN CORPORATIONS
Country
France

Germany

Italy

Spain

United
Kingdom

Immediate Ownership Data
The Herald Tribune (1997), "French Company Handbook
1997", SFBParis Bourse
Financial Times (1997): "Extel Financial"
Worldscope (1998)
http://www.boursedeparis.fr/fr/market8/fsg830.htm
Commerzbank (1997): "Wer gehört zu wem"
(http://www.commerzbank.com/navigate/date_frm.htm)
Financial Times (1997): "Extel Financial"
Worldscope (1998)
CONSOB (1997): "Bollettino  edizione speciale n. 4/97 
Compagine azionaria delle società quotate in borsa o
ammesse alle negoziazioni nel mercato ristretto al 31
dicembre 1996"
(http://www.consob.it/trasparenza_soc_quot/trasp_soc_qu
ot.htm)
Il Sole 24 ore (1997): "Il taccuino dell'azionista"

DualClass Shares
Datastream (1999)
Financial Times (1997): "Extel Financial"
Les Echos (1996)
Muus (1998)

Business Groups
The Herald Tribune (1997), "French
Company Handbook 1997", SFBParis
Bourse
Financial Times (1997): "Extel
Financial"

Datastream (1999)
Financial Times (1997): "Extel Financial"
Die Welt (1996)
Becht and Boehmer (1998)
Datastream (1999)
Il Sole 24 ore (1997): "Il taccuino
dell'azionista"

Commerzbank (1997): "Wer gehört zu
wem"
Extel Financial

Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores (1998):
"Participaciones significativas en sociedades cotizadas"
(http://www.cnmv.es/english/cnmve.htm)

Datastream (1999)
Financial Times (1997): "Extel Financial"
ABC (1996)
CrespiCladera and GarciaCestona (1998)

Financial Times (1997): "Extel Financial"
London Stock Exchange (1997): "The London Stock
Exchange Yearbook"
Financial Times
Worldscope (1998)
http://www.hemscott.com/equities/company/

Datastream (1999)
Financial Times (1997): "Extel Financial"
Financial Times (1996)

Il Sole 24 ore (1997): "Il taccuino
dell'azionista"
http://
www.fiatgroup.com/it/informazioni/if2i
nformaz1.htm
http://www.olivetti.it/group/
http://www.pirelli.com/company/index.h
tm
Comision Nacional del Mercado de
Valores (1998): "Participaciones
significativas en sociedades cotizadas"
(http://www.cnmv.es/english/cnmve.htm
)
Extel Financial
Extel Financial
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TABLE 1: ACCESS TO RELATED PARTY LENDING, OWNERSHIP/CONTROL &
MEAN LEVERAGE RATIOS BY COUNTRY
The sample includes 3,448 nonfinancial corporations with consolidated accounts at the end of 1996. Creditor rights is the
index of creditor protection developed in LaPorta, LopezdeSilanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). The index aggregates 4
categories of creditor rights. % corps in a group that controls some financial institution is the percentage of companies that
are affiliated to a group that includes at least one financial institution (e.g., a company with SIC code 60006999). A
corporation is “groupaffiliated” if it satisfies one of the following criteria: (i) it is controlled by a shareholder via
pyramiding, i.e., indirectly through a chain of corporations; (ii) it controls another corporation in the sample; (iii) it has the
same controlling shareholder as some other corporation in the sample; (iv) its controlling shareholder is a widelyheld
corporation or a widelyheld financial institution. O/C is the ratio of ownership rights (e.g., the claims on the company's
cash flows by the largest ultimate controlling shareholder) to voting rights (voting stake held by the largest controlling
shareholder), for corporations with an ultimate owner who owns at least 5% of the shares. D/TA is the ratio of book value of
short and long term financial debt to total assets (%). D/(D+E) is the ratio of book value of short and long term financial
debt to the sum of book value of debt plus book value of equity (ordinary and preferred) (%). Q is the ratio of market value
of (ordinary and preferred) equity plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of equity plus the book value of
debt. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Country

Number of Creditors
corps
rights

% corps in a group
O/C
that controls some
financial institution
Panel A: Summary statistics
11.56
0.941

D/TA

D/(D+E)

Q

22.23

36.68

1.61

France

372

0

Germany

309

3

13.59

0.835

23.00

41.75

1.90

HK

212

4

21.70

0.882

24.49

30.63

1.43

Indonesia

81

4

40.74

0.789

35.32

41.45

1.40

Italy

96

2

28.13

0.720

22.82

37.68

1.19

Japan

832

2

64.42

0.596

33.12

47.58

1.38

Malaysia

149

4

23.49

0.844

24.55

32.23

2.91

Philippines

36

0

36.11

0.873

23.64

27.91

1.73

Singapore

145

4

3.45

0.794

22.52

27.79

1.77

South Korea

138

3

38.41

0.908

52.30

69.43

0.99

Spain

82

2

25.61

0.920

18.98

28.77

1.67

Taiwan

83

2

0.00

0.851

25.06

29.17

2.05

Thailand

70

3

12.86

0.939

40.58

47.47

1.35

U.K

843

4

43.42

0.833

17.57

28.17

2.22

All

3,448

2.74

35.64

0.794

25.95

37.99

1.74

Panel B: Tstatistics for differences between means
Strong (> 3) vs. weak (< 3) creditors rights

4.20 a

6.68 a

0.46 a

Corporations affiliated vs. nonaffiliated to a group that controls some
financial institution

3.46 a

2.03 a

0.17 a

1.05

2.07 b

4.10 a

O/C = 1 vs O/C < 1 corporations
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TABLE 2: OLS REGRESSIONS OF LEVERAGE ON THE OWNERSHIP/CONTROL RATIO BY ACCESS TO RELATED PARTY LENDING
The sample includes 1,229 corporations affiliated to a group that controls some financial institution and 2,219 corporations that are not affiliated to any group
that controls a financial institution. The regressions use ordinary least squares. D/TA is the ratio of book value of short and long term financial debt to total assets.
D/(D+E) is the ratio of book value of short and long term financial debt to the sum of book value of debt plus book value of equity (ordinary and preferred). O/C
is the ratio of ownership rights (e.g., the claims on the company's cash flows by the largest ultimate controlling shareholder) to voting rights (voting stake held by
the largest controlling shareholder), for corporations with an ultimate owner who owns at least 5% of the shares. Q is the ratio of market value of (ordinary and
preferred) equity plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of equity plus the book value of debt. Creditor rights is the index of creditor protection
developed in LaPorta, LopezdeSilanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). The index aggregates 4 categories of creditor rights. Ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of the
book value of total assets. NoSic is the number of different twodigit SIC code sectors in which the firm reports at least 10% of sales. Tangib is the ratio of fixed
to total assets. bA is the asset beta. We first define a corporation’s equity beta as b S = s I rI,M , where sI is the standard deviation of its stock return, rI,M, is the
sM
correlation coefficient between its stock return and the return on the market index (see below), and sM is the standard deviation of the market return. Standard
deviations and correlation coefficients are computed using the monthly stock returns over the period Jan 1994 to Dec 1996; for corporations that went public
Sb S
through 1994 the period is Jan 1995 to Dec 1996. We assume that the beta of debt equals zero, and compute the asset beta from the relation b A =
,
B(1  t C ) + S
where S is the market value of equity, B is the book value of debt, and tc is the corporation's tax rate. The latter is computed by dividing its taxes by pretax
income. The market indexes used are: France: SBF 250; Germany: Faz Aktien; Hong Kong: Hang Seng Index; Indonesia: Jakarta Composite Index; Italy: Banca
Commerciale Italy Index; Japan: Nikkei Dow; Malaysia: KLSE Composite Index; Philippines: Philippines S.E. Composite Index; Singapore: Straits Times
Industrial; South Korea: South Korea Composite Index; Spain: Madrid Stock Exchange; Taiwan: Weighted Price Index; Thailand: Bangkok Stock Exchange
Index; United Kingdom: FT Index. BankrDec is the company’s bankruptcy decile. We first rank corporations in ascending order of their ratio of earnings before
interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) to interest expenses. BankrDec assigns corporations to their decile in this ranking. Corporations in the first decile have
the lowest (typically negative) EBITDA per unit of interest costs, and face the most difficulty in meeting interest payments. All regressions include industry
fixedeffects. Pvalues, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses below the coefficients estimates.
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Panel A: Corporations affiliated to a group that controls some financial institution (N=1,229)
Dependent
Variable:
D/TA

D/(D+E)

O/C

Q

Creditors O/C* Cred. Ln(TA)
rights

rights

NoSic

Tangib

bA

BankrDec Intercept Adj. R2 Prob > F

0.158

0.007

0.062

0.049

0.032

0.007

0.020

0.075

0.058

0.520

(0.00)

(0.51)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.37)

(0.71)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.120

0.005

0.050

0.044

0.018

0.005

0.122

0.051

0.041

0.369

(0.01)

(0.41)

(0.00)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.33)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

45.6%

0.00

46.9%

0.00

Panel B: Corporations nonaffiliated to a group that controls a financial institution (N=2,219)
Dependent
Variable:
D/TA

D/(D+E)

O/C

Q

Creditors O/C* Cred. Ln(TA)
rights

rights

NoSic

Tangib

bA

BankrDec Intercept Adj. R2 Prob > F

0.121

0.000

0.039

0.033

0.028

0.002

0.008

0.043

0.053

0.452

(0.20)

(0.98)

(0.18)

(0.21)

(0.00)

(0.78)

(0.87)

(0.15)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.085

0.005

0.024

0.025

0.016

0.001

0.132

0.013

0.038

0.283

(0.21)

(0.13)

(0.28)

(0.19)

(0.03)

(0.89)

(0.01)

(0.52)

(0.00)

(0.01)

41.3%

0.00

41.4%

0.00
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TABLE 3: 2SLS REGRESSIONS OF LEVERAGE ON THE OWNERSHIP/CONTROL RATIO BY ACCESS TO RELATED PARTY LENDING
The sample includes 1,229 corporations affiliated to a group that controls some financial institution and 2,219 corporations that are not affiliated to any group
that controls a financial institution. This table reports the estimated coefficients and associated pvalues (in parentheses) of twostage least squares (2SLS)
regressions in which O/C is treated as endogenous variable. The instrumental variable used is a proxy for nonpecuniary private benefits of control based on the
name of the firm. We follow Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2007), in defining a dummy that takes the value 1 if the company’s name includes the name of any of
its top officers (CEO, chairman of the board, president, a vicepresident, or secretary of the board), as reported in Worldscope, and 0 otherwise. D/TA is the ratio
of book value of short and long term financial debt to total assets. D/(D+E) is the ratio of book value of short and long term financial debt to the sum of book
value of debt plus book value of equity (ordinary and preferred). O/C is the ratio of ownership rights (e.g., the claims on the company's cash flows by the largest
ultimate controlling shareholder) to voting rights (voting stake held by the largest controlling shareholder), for corporations with an ultimate owner who owns at
least 5% of the shares. Q is the ratio of market value of (ordinary and preferred) equity plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of equity plus the
book value of debt. Creditor rights is the index of creditor protection developed in LaPorta, LopezdeSilanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). The index aggregates
4 categories of creditor rights. Ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. NoSic is the number of different twodigit SIC code sectors in
which the firm reports at least 10% of sales. Tangib is the ratio of fixed to total assets. bA is the asset beta. We first define a corporation’s equity beta as
sr
b S = I I,M , where sI is the standard deviation of its stock return, rI,M, is the correlation coefficient between its stock return and the return on the market index
sM
(see below), and sM is the standard deviation of the market return. Standard deviations and correlation coefficients are computed using the monthly stock returns
over the period Jan 1994 to Dec 1996; for corporations that went public through 1994 the period is Jan 1995 to Dec 1996. We assume that the beta of debt equals
Sb S
zero, and compute the asset beta from the relation b =
, where S is the market value of equity, B is the book value of debt, and tc is the
A
B(1  t C ) + S
corporation's tax rate. The latter is computed by dividing its taxes by pretax income. The market indexes used are: France: SBF 250; Germany: Faz Aktien; Hong
Kong: Hang Seng Index; Indonesia: Jakarta Composite Index; Italy: Banca Commerciale Italy Index; Japan: Nikkei Dow; Malaysia: KLSE Composite Index;
Philippines: Philippines S.E. Composite Index; Singapore: Straits Times Industrial; South Korea: South Korea Composite Index; Spain: Madrid Stock Exchange;
Taiwan: Weighted Price Index; Thailand: Bangkok Stock Exchange Index; United Kingdom: FT Index. BankrDec is the company’s bankruptcy decile. We first
rank corporations in ascending order of their ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) to interest expenses. BankrDec assigns
corporations to their decile in this ranking. Corporations in the first decile have the lowest (typically negative) EBITDA per unit of interest costs, and face the
most difficulty in meeting interest payments. Pvalues, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses below the
coefficients estimates.
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Panel A: Corporations affiliated to a group that controls some financial institution (N=1,229)
Dependent
Variable:
D/TA

D/(D+E)

O/C

Q

Creditors O/C* Cred. Ln(TA)
rights

rights

NoSic

Tangib

bA

BankrDec Intercept Prob > F

1.915

0.006

0.477

0.628

0.024

0.004

0.082

0.124

0.058

1.836

(0.02)

(0.53)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.52)

(0.26)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

1.559

0.005

0.391

0.517

0.011

0.003

0.208

0.093

0.041

1.451

(0.00)

(0.52)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.05)

(0.57)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.00

0.00

Panel B: Corporations nonaffiliated to a group that controls a financial institution (N=2,219)
Dependent
Variable:
D/TA

D/(D+E)

O/C

Q

Creditors O/C* Cred. Ln(TA)
rights

rights

NoSic

Tangib

bA

BankrDec Intercept Prob > F

1.809

0.000

0.542

0.576

0.015

0.009

0.015

0.057

0.054

2.167

(0.91)

(0.98)

(0.91)

(0.92)

(0.91)

(0.90)

(0.95)

(0.73)

(0.00)

(0.90)

3.858

0.009

1.151

1.245

0.048

0.017

0.067

0.022

0.037

3.707

(0.82)

(0.60)

(0.82)

(0.82)

(0.72)

(0.81)

(0.79)

(0.89)

(0.00)

(0.83)

0.00

0.00
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TABLE 4: 2SLS REGRESSIONS OF LEVERAGE BY CREDITOR PROTECTION.
The sample includes 1,229 corporations affiliated to a group that controls some financial institution. This table reports the estimated coefficients and associated
pvalues (in parentheses) of twostage least squares (2SLS) regressions in which O/C is treated as endogenous variable. The instrumental variable used is a proxy
for nonpecuniary private benefits of control based on the name of the firm. We follow Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2007), in defining a dummy that takes the
value 1 if the company’s name includes the name of any of its top officers (CEO, chairman of the board, president, a vicepresident, or secretary of the board), as
reported in Worldscope, and 0 otherwise. D/TA is the ratio of book value of short and long term financial debt to total assets. D/(D+E) is the ratio of book value
of short and long term financial debt to the sum of book value of debt plus book value of equity (ordinary and preferred). O/C is the ratio of ownership rights
(e.g., the claims on the company's cash flows by the largest ultimate controlling shareholder) to voting rights (voting stake held by the largest controlling
shareholder), for corporations with an ultimate owner who owns at least 5% of the shares. Q is the ratio of market value of (ordinary and preferred) equity plus
the book value of debt divided by the book value of equity plus the book value of debt. Creditor rights is the index of creditor protection developed in LaPorta,
LopezdeSilanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). The index aggregates 4 categories of creditor rights. Ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of the book value of total
assets. NoSic is the number of different twodigit SIC code sectors in which the firm reports at least 10% of sales. Tangib is the ratio of fixed to total assets. bA is
the asset beta. We first define a corporation’s equity beta as b = s I rI,M , where sI is the standard deviation of its stock return, rI,M, is the correlation coefficient
S
sM
between its stock return and the return on the market index (see below), and sM is the standard deviation of the market return. Standard deviations and correlation
coefficients are computed using the monthly stock returns over the period Jan 1994 to Dec 1996; for corporations that went public through 1994 the period is Jan
Sb S
1995 to Dec 1996. We assume that the beta of debt equals zero, and compute the asset beta from the relation b =
, where S is the market value of
A
B(1  t C ) + S
equity, B is the book value of debt, and tc is the corporation's tax rate. The latter is computed by dividing its taxes by pretax income. The market indexes used are:
France: SBF 250; Germany: Faz Aktien; Hong Kong: Hang Seng Index; Indonesia: Jakarta Composite Index; Italy: Banca Commerciale Italy Index; Japan:
Nikkei Dow; Malaysia: KLSE Composite Index; Philippines: Philippines S.E. Composite Index; Singapore: Straits Times Industrial; South Korea: South Korea
Composite Index; Spain: Madrid Stock Exchange; Taiwan: Weighted Price Index; Thailand: Bangkok Stock Exchange Index; United Kingdom: FT Index.
BankrDec is the company’s bankruptcy decile. We first rank corporations in ascending order of their ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation
(EBITDA) to interest expenses. BankrDec assigns corporations to their decile in this ranking. Corporations in the first decile have the lowest (typically negative)
EBITDA per unit of interest costs, and face the most difficulty in meeting interest payments. Pvalues, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the
country level, are reported in parentheses below the coefficients estimates.
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Panel A: Corporations based in countries with strong (> 3) creditor rights
Dependent Variable:
D/TA

D/(D+E)

O/C

Q

Ln(TA)

NoSic

Tangib

bA

BankrDec

Intercept

Prob > F

1.430

0.032

0.015

0.000

0.154

0.100

0.039

0.507

0.00

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.59)

(0.98)

(0.12)

(0.02)

(0.00)

(0.10)

1.262

0.036

0.000

0.003

0.003

0.072

0.027

0.454

(0.02)

(0.03)

(1.00)

(0.81)

(0.97)

(0.05)

(0.00)

(0.14)

0.00

Panel B: Corporations based in countries with weak (< 3) creditor rights
Dependent Variable:
D/TA

D/(D+E)

O/C

Q

Ln(TA)

NoSic

Tangib

bA

BankrDec

Intercept

Prob > F

0.811

0.057

0.035

0.010

0.354

0.087

0.065

0.587

0.00

(0.02)

(0.32)

(0.00)

(0.20)

(0.05)

(0.08)

(0.00)

(0.01)

0.634

0.030

0.023

0.005

0.437

0.062

0.045

0.391

(0.01)

(0.43)

(0.05)

(0.38)

(0.01)

(0.10)

(0.00)

(0.06)

0.00

